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Abstract
In China the problem of aging is only now emerging, however, when the
population does start to age, it will do so faster than any population in history.  In this
largely descriptive paper, we look at the challenges faced in the areas of old-age
pensions, health care and disability services.  First, we identify the main institutions
involved.  Then we present ad hoc projections of pensions and health spending and the
number of disabled persons.  Our conclusion is that, unchecked, rising demand in these
sectors has the potential to give China the social insurance spending profile of a
developed country while it is still at the level of development of a poor one.
Demography makes some increases in spending inevitable.  However, the most
important variables such as coverage of the pension system and the "underlying" rate of
medical spending growth are responsive to policy.  The paper concludes with an appeal
to policy makers to adopt forward looking strategies now, while there is still time to
develop appropriate policies and institutions.
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Introduction
China will be the first country in history to experience demographic aging while
still in the phase of rapid economic development and modernization.  China is also in
the process of enacting economic reforms, creating tension within the existing social
security system.  This paper is a survey of the main features and problems facing the
old-age pension system, the health care system, and disability services in China.  While
mainly descriptive, it also uses simple projection methods to illustrate the challenges
faced by the social security system.  The intended audience is the policy community,
and the purpose of the piece is to make a case for the importance of forward-looking,
quantitative planning in the social sector reform process.
The first section of the paper describes the unique features of China.  Among
these are extreme demographic trends due to the “one-child family” policy and the
impacts of ongoing economic reforms on the social security system.  Current changes in
the social security system are put in economic and social context.  In the second section,
the social security system in China is described at various administrative levels.  Section
three focuses on the sustainability of the system, identifying driving forces and the key
issues.  Assumptions on driving forces are made and illustrative projections are
presented.  The final section elicits a few conclusions.
1. Background
1.1 Demographic trends
Virtually all countries have experienced declining fertility coupled with increase
in life expectancy.  What distinguishes China is the speed and extent of fertility decline,
which will translate into a similarly extreme population age distribution.
1.1.1 “One-child family” policy
Figure 1 shows change in the crude birth rate (CBR, births divided by
population) from 1952 to 1997 in China.  We observe rapid decrease since the early
1970s, particularly from 1970 to 1975, a period over which the CBR decreased by
almost 10 per thousand.  This first phase of rapid fertility decline corresponded to wide
implementation of the “one-child family” policy.  The term "one-child policy" is  an
overstatement, since the rule of one child per family was never rigidly enforced in the
countryside.  "Planned birth policy" would be a more accurate description of the policy,
2however, for convenience we will use the conventional term.  There was a slight
increase in the CBR in the 1980s, possibly reflecting rural resistance to the policy;
however, fertility decline resumed in the 1990s.  This second phase of decline reflected
not only government policy, but also a combination of industrialization, urbanization,
growing affluence and cultural change.  Over only about 20 years, the total fertility rate
(TFR, number of children a woman would have if she experienced the age-specific
fertility rates observed in the population a given year) dropped from 6 to about 2.  Even
by the standards of other Asian countries which experienced accelerated fertility decline
(Japan, Thailand, and others) this pace of decline is unprecedented.
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Figure 1: Birth rate change in China (1952-1997)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1998)
1.1.2 Rising old-age dependency ratio
When the Chinese government introduced the one-child policy in the 1970s, it
seems not to have anticipated its eventual age-distribution impacts.  Yet, in roughly
2020, the absolute number of 15-64 year olds will start to decline while the number of
elderly will grow (see Figure 2, based on UN population projections where absolute
numbers are measured on the left-hand axis).  The old-age dependency ratio (population
over 65 relative to population aged 15-64, expressed as a percentage and measured on
the right-hand axis), will rise from about 10% in recent years to almost 40% in 2050,
with the phase of most rapid increase beginning between 2015 and 2020.  These
aggregate, rather abstract trends are perhaps best interpreted more concretely at the
household level.  Assuming, for simplicity, that members of the working-age population
produce while the elderly and children only consume, each couple belonging to the
"only child generation" will have to produce enough to meet, in addition to their own
needs, the needs of 4 elderly parents and at least 1 child.  Nor is this economic challenge
far removed in the future: the leading edge of the "only child generation" is now (2000)
in its twenties.
3Figure 2: Population trend and dependency ratio of China (1970-2050)
Source: UN population projections (1998)
1.1.3 High absolute number of elderly population
According to the 1995 China 1% population census, there are approximately  80
million people in China above 65, accounting for  6.5% of the total Chinese population.
Thus, China accounts for half of the elderly population in Asia, and for one-fifth of the
entire elderly world population.  Most strikingly, there are more elderly in China than in
Western Europe, the region which usually comes to mind when global population aging
is discussed.  According to UN population projections, in 2050 the percentage of people
above 65 in the total Chinese population will reach around 22.6%, i.e. nearly one in
four.
1.1.4 Increase of the “oldest old”
The word “elderly” typically connotes someone who is no longer engaged in
economic production and has a high level of need for health and long-term care
services.  Policy makers all over the world have taken comfort from the fact that, if
health trends continue to be favorable, persons in age groups now conventionally
labeled “elderly” may continue to lead economically productive, healthy lives.
However, it seems likely that even given substantial health improvements over the next
fifty years, there will still be some interval preceding death during which persons will
be “elderly” in the conventional sense of the term.   In this case, the focus should be put
on the “oldest old,” say the population above 80 or 85.  The nature of demographic
aging in China (and around the world) is that the "oldest old" population is growing
much more rapidly than the elderly population as a whole.  In 1990 there were around 8
4million persons above 80 in China, in 2000 about 28 million – a near tripling in only ten
years.
1.1.5 Spatial imbalances in aging
China has long been characterized by a pronounced rural-urban development
gap.  China's urban sector is leading the way in terms of demographic aging.  The
difference between urban and rural age distributions is, however, nothing new.  For
example, even as long ago as 1979, Shanghai was already “aged,” with 16.7% of the
population over 65.   At the end of 1994, the highest aged dependency ratio (65+
relative to 15-64) was 16.3% in Shanghai, while the lowest was 5.7% in Ningxia; the
national average (see Figure 2) was 9.3%. The high degree of regional difference makes
it especially difficult to create a nationally coherent social security policy.  This will be
discussed further in the next section.
1.2 Economic and institutional context of social security reform in
China
Economic reform, i.e. redefinition of public-private roles consistent with “market
socialism,” has been going on in China since the late 1970s.  Social security is a key
reform issue because of its close connections with other reform areas.  In this section,
we list major areas of reform and draw attention to links with social security.
1.2.1 State-owned enterprise reform
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China provide their workers with extensive
cash and in-kind benefits such as pensions, health care, disability insurance, housing,
and family allowances.  Public subsidies to SOEs effectively decouple these benefits
from the profitability (indeed, the solvency) of the enterprise, tending naturally to
encourage the expansion and proliferation of benefits.  In the new market environment,
however, and with the number of pensioners rising rapidly, many SOEs find it difficult
to compete with private-sector firms.  Some have simply terminated, reduced or
postponed promised benefit payments; thus, by May 1998, national pension arrears
added up to 8700 million yuan and affected 3.56 million pensioners.  Policy makers are
in a dilemma: generous SOE social security benefits are unsustainable, but for many
thousands of employees, there is no alternative source of basic social insurance.
Shutting down an SOE is more than shutting down a firm, it means shutting down a
mini-welfare state on which thousands of workers, pensioners, and their families
depend.
1.2.2 Labor market reform
The formal social security system covers only SOEs and collective enterprises.
Therefore, there is a huge difference in benefits between different types of enterprises
and different areas of the country.  As a result, labor mobility across enterprises,
industries or provinces is discouraged and efficiency gains in the labor market are
impeded (Fan et al. 1998).
51.2.3 Reform of government institutions
The challenge facing Chinese government institutions is not so much their large
size as their inefficiency.  For one task there are typically several decision-makers, often
without a coherent policy, leading to a lengthy decision making process with sometimes
less than satisfactory results.  In the case of social security, at the national level, the
Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the Ministry of Health have all
historically been involved in social security policy making and social security system
management.  In the 1997, a new Ministry of Labor and Social Security Ministry was
established to unify social security policy and give coherence to social security system
management.
1.2.4 Rural and agricultural reform
Rural China, comprising 70% of the total population, is virtually uncovered by
the formal social security.  Development of the Township and Village Enterprise (TVE)
system, urbanization and industrialization, and rising levels of affluence are bound to
affect the traditional Confucian religious culture and could weaken the informal family
care system.
1.2.5 Public finance and financial sector reform
Social security reform is connected with public finance reform through the
operation of the pension system.  Whatever the direction of social security reform,
higher individual contributions are unquestionably on the horizon.  The collection of
these contributions will be closely connected to the levying of taxes, which is presently
underdeveloped in China.  Distribution of the pension benefits will also place new
demands on the public finance system.  Social security reform is also likely to be linked
to structural changes in the financial system.  The experience of other countries is that,
with rising affluence, demand for social insurance rises faster than the public sector can
keep pace with it and that the commercial pension and health insurance sector evolves
to fill this gap.
2. The Current Social Security System
The first social insurance regulations were issued in 1951 (Interim Labor
Insurance Regulation).  From that time until the 1980s, the system remained relatively
unchanged.  During the 1990s, however, changes have been so frequent that it is
difficult for social insurance researchers to keep up to date.
There is a fairly sizeable English-language literature which can be dated back to
Hussain and Ahmad's (1989) “Social Security in China: A Historical Perspective.”
Among the representative works are; from a historical point of view, Hussain 1993;
from an economic and welfare point of view, Liu 1991, Hussain 1994, Lin 1996, Selden
and You 1997, and Song and Chu 1997; from a policy point of view, Guo 1993 and Hou
1995; from a demographic point of view, Jiang 1994, and Zeng and Vaupel 1989; from
a sociological point of view, Leung 1995, Jiang 1995, and Lee 1996; and from a
statistical point of view, Shi 1994 and Tsui et al. 1995.  The World Bank’s 1997 “China
2020 Series” including 2 monographs dealing with social security -- “Old Age Security”
and “Financing Health Care.”
62.1 The old-age pension system
2.1.1 History
China’s old-age pension system dates back to 1951, when the first labor
insurance regulations created a social security system for state-sector employees.  Under
these regulations, employees of SOEs were tied to their work units and enjoyed cradle-
to-grave benefits including generous retirement pensions, free health care, income
support when sick or disabled, and housing (Song and Chu, 1997).  Persons employed
in the urban collective sectors also had some benefits, but at a lower level and varying
according to the financial condition of the work unit.  At that time, most of the
employed labor force in urban China was in the state-owned and collective sectors
(including government departments), and there were no social security programs for the
then-negligible private sector. The retirement age for men was set at 60 for men and 55
for women.
The 1951 labor insurance regulations were amended in 1953, 1958, 1978, 1986
and several times in 1990s.  The general effect of policy changes before the 1990s was a
substantial increase in the number of retirees and pension costs.  The number of retirees
increased tenfold from 3.1 million in 1978 to 30.9 million in 1995, including 24.0
million from the state sectors (SOEs, collective enterprises, and government).  Pension
costs in the state sectors increased 80 times over roughly the same period, from 1.41
billion yuan in 1978 to 84.4 billion yuan in 1994 (see Annex, Table A1).
From the very beginning of Chinese social security policy, the government
limited its concern to the urban sector.  Although the Communist Party made an effort
to change many aspects of the rural way of life, these did not include the Confucian
tradition of elder care (Davis, 1994).  The small number f elderly without family support
in the rural area was taken care of either by government or rural collectives.
2.1.2 The old-age pension system and its problems ca. 2000
Despite the amendments mentioned above, the social insurance system in 2000
broadly replicates the system put in place fifty years ago.  A formal pension system only
exists in the urban area; for most rural residents, family care is the predominant resource
for old age (Leung, 1997; Shi, 1994).   Within the urban sector, the formal social
security system is mostly limited to employees of SOEs, comprising about 50% of the
urban workforce.
Figure 3 attempts to summarize the most salient points of the pension system in
roughly 2000.  In theory, central government acts as policy maker in the area of social
security. However, there was for many years no single authoritative institution to
exercise overall leadership and management of social security activities (Hou, 1995).
Rather, responsibility for the social security system was shared among the Ministry of
Labor, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of Health, and others.  However, the
interests of various ministries did not always coincide, so in March 1998, a new
department in the central government, called Ministry of Labor and Social Security, was
established.  This new ministry, charged with management of the whole social security
system in China, comprises 5 departments: old-age pensions, health care,
unemployment insurance, rural social insurance, and funds supervision. This marks the
first time since 1949 that China has tried to have a unified management of social
security affairs (Wang, 1998).
7Urban population.  Contribution rates at some SOEs run as high as 30%.  In
view of this and given pronounced differences of age structure across provinces, a
provincial pooling arrangement has been put in place.  As of October 1998, 21
provinces were involved in pooling systems and another 11 provinces were preparing to
enter into such arrangements. These pooling systems relieve the heavy pension burden
on some SOEs, however, at the expense of requiring poor, demographically young
provinces to subsidize wealthy, demographically old provinces  (see Annex, Figure A1).
An emerging area of concern is the labor contract system established in 1986 in
an effort to reduce inefficiencies associated with lifetime employment contracts.
Contract workers’ pensions are fully funded whereas permanent workers’ pensions are
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.  As a group, contract workers are significantly
younger than permanent workers.  It has already been observed in some province
pooling systems that contract workers’ supposedly earmarked contributions are being
used to finance the pensions of retired permanent workers (Lin, 1996).
Rural population.  The aged population in rural China has four options for old-
age support.  The first option is to remain in the labor force and, indeed, it is observed
that many healthy elderly rural Chinese continue working long after the official
retirement age.  The second option is to depend on family care and financial help from
kin.  This, the main support resource in rural China, will be discussed in the paragraphs
below.  The third option, on which the 3-4% of the rural elderly with no available
family support must rely, is support from government or collective enterprise funds.
Finally, in a few relatively developed rural areas, mainly on the eastern coast of China,
experimental rural pension schemes are being implemented.
According to a 1992 survey on the support system for the elderly, on average
around 74% of rural children report that they provide financial support to  aged parents.
This number increases with parents’ age and is higher in poor areas.  Nor are family
care ties limited to ties between children and parents, they also include ties to siblings,
cousins etc.  After the Chinese Community Party (CCP) came to power in 1949,
traditional family care values were not discarded like some other Confucian ideals;
instead they were encouraged and even extolled.  The CCP’s  fairly loose interpretation
of the “one-child policy” in rural areas can be interpreted as a similar compromise.
However, there are signs that the traditional rural family system is changing.  Fertility is
declining, successful TVEs are diversifying the economic base away from agriculture;
young family members have become more mobile, and modernization, urbanization and
opening to the external world have weakened traditional family institutions (McCarthy
and Zheng, 1996).
Partly in response to these trends, since 1991 the Ministry of Civil Affairs has
experimented with rural pension schemes in chosen localities.  By the end of 1997, 2000
counties (most of them relatively developed rural areas) in almost every province were
participating in this program at some level.  Around 82 million peasants were
participating and 13 billion yuan had been accumulated.  The basic problem to be
overcome, not surprisingly, is that participants’ incomes are very low.  In 1995, the
average accumulation per participant was only 80 yuan, about 2% of a farmer’s annual
income.  This amount is unlikely to generate a replacement rate (income after retirement
relative to income prior to retirement, expressed as a percentage) over 5% (World Bank,
1997a).  Other problems include the fact that inflation-indexed annuities are not
available and funds are not well managed.
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Figure 3: Current pension system coverage, structure and main problems
2.2 Health care and disability services
2.2.1 History
Health care and disability services in China are, broadly speaking, structured
like the old-age pension system described above, and face similar problems.  Like the
pension system, the health system dates from the early 1950s.  In the urban sector, SOE
employees and government workers (as well as their dependents) receive health benefits
and disability insurance as part of their compensation package, while the rest of the
urban population is virtually without formal insurance.
9The most significant difference between the health care and old-age pension
systems is the strong emphasis on provision of health care in rural areas, a policy  dating
back to the Cultural Revolution (Hu, 1980).  During that time, a cooperative medical
system benefiting almost all of the rural population was established. Under this system,
village collectives managed and financed the activities of "barefoot doctors" (peasants
who received 3 to 6 months of medical training) to provide basic medical care to
villagers.  Patients suffering from more serious conditions were referred to a higher
level, i.e. to hospitals at the village or township level and, subsequently, the county or
city level.  Medical expenditures at higher levels were reimbursed to the collective up to
a certain percentage.  In this way,  universal health care coverage was provided to rural
China before 1978.  In urban areas, health services were provided by local clinics, street
hospitals, production unit hospitals, city hospitals, and provincial hospitals.  The basic
rule was that patients progressed to higher levels via a referral system.  Local authorities
had extensive autonomy regarding the operation of health facilities within its
jurisdiction.
2.2.2 Reforms and the current health care system
Since 1978, the rural cooperative medical system has disintegrated and there has
been a sharp reduction in the number of “barefoot doctors" (Shi, 1993a,b).  In particular,
replacement of the old commune work-point system by the new production
responsibility system in agriculture transferred responsibility from the collective to the
household.  As a result, arrangements for paying village “barefoot doctors” no longer
functioned and there was little money left for the collective to pay for higher-level
health services.  Less than 10% of the rural population today is still covered by the
cooperative medical system, as opposed to 90% in 1978.  The cooperative medical
system has been replaced by a fee-for-service system.  Combined with the lack of
insurance, the result is that some 700 million rural Chinese pay for health services out of
pocket.  The Chinese government tried to reestablish the rural cooperative medical
system in 1994 in some selected pilot counties, but the results have not been convincing.
By contrast to the rural health care system, the urban health care system is today
little different than it was in 1978.  As in the case of the pension system, there are two
urban health insurance systems.  The government insurance system, covering
government workers and retirees, members of the military and university students, has a
total of 30 million members, i.e. 2% of the total population.  The SOE insurance system,
covering SOE  employees and retirees, has a 140 million members, i.e. 12% of the total
population. Members of these two systems enjoy unlimited coverage with low co-
payments and virtually zero premiums.  Not surprisingly, from 1978 onwards, health
expenditure for these two urban insurance systems has increased dramatically, while
expenditure for the rural cooperative system has decreased continuously (see Figure 4
and Annex, Table A2).
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The lack of a coherent health insurance system leads to a number of problems.
High expenditures to support the government and SOE systems put pressure on the
government budget and impair the competitiveness of SOEs.  Patients without insurance
are discouraged from seeking needed care.  In 1994 the Chinese government began
some health care reform experiments at selected locations. The main ideas include
broadening coverage, creating individual health saving accounts, reforming provider
payment mechanisms, etc.  However, results have been mixed. A summary of health
care coverage, the structure and the remaining problems is given in Figure 5.
2.2.3 Disability and long-term care services
Many studies have demonstrated that disability is positively correlated with age
(Heikkinen, 1983).  The great majority of less severely disabled elderly persons receive
care from co-resident family members.  The most severely disabled elderly who have
formal medical insurance stay in hospitals and receive professional care.  Those without
formal insurance are dependent on family support or, lacking that, the community.
Development of community services for the disabled is being actively encouraged by
the Chinese government.
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3. Thinking about the future of social security in China
3.1 Driving forces
The main directions of Chinese social security policy appear clear.  In the area of
pensions, the Chinese government will try to maintain the family support system in
rural areas and at the same time reduce the heavy pension burden on enterprises by
requiring increased individual contributions.  In health care, China needs to return to a
policy of vigorous financial support for public health, recognizing that many health care
12
services must be financed by the government if they are to be provided at optimal social
levels (World Bank, 1997b).
In this section, we look at some of the forces driving social insurance trends and
provide some ad hoc projections of the future.
3.1.1 Population age structure
Pensions, health and disability are all tightly connected with population age
structure, and are especially correlated with the trend and the situation of the elderly
population.  Under conditions corresponding to the UN population projection illustrated
in Figure 2 above, the current “pay-as-you-go” pension scheme will not be sustainable
without drastic increases in the contribution rate paid by workers.  Large increases in
the elderly population also emphasize the urgency of expanding health care and
disability services.
How uncertain are these trends?  Population size and age structure have a long
memory, i.e. they are characterized by strong inertia.  The population that will be aged
50 and higher in 2050 has already been born.  The women whose children will be aged
15-49 in 2050 will, assuming that the average age of childbearing is 25, have been born
between 1975 and 2010.  Events of the next decade are unlikely to change this number
much, nor are these women likely to experience fertility drastically different from that
currently observed (even if the one-child policy is attenuated, modernization and other
factors will actito reduce fertility).  All in all, among the many uncertainties which make
it difficult to project far into the future, demographic uncertainty is the least of our
problems.
3.1.2 Economic development
It is now broadly appreciated that, in the West, the problems faced by social
security systems are not due to demographic aging per se, but rather to the fact that
benefits expanded rapidly during the last fifty years.  This expansion reflected, in large
part, rising economic prosperity and the resulting demand for leisure (i.e., years of
retirement) and health care.
Whereas Western countries experienced demographic aging after having
attained a high level of economic development, China will experience population aging
while it is still a developing country.  The dilemma faced by social security policy
makers is as follows.  As a poor country, China cannot afford a comprehensive
Western-style social security system.  Yet, from the individual point of view, per capita
income is too low (especially in rural areas) for households to meet their own needs for
retirement income and health care.  The challenge in social security is to design
programs which meet legitimate needs while avoiding expensive, unsustainable
solutions.
Economic development involves not only the level of output, but also its
structure. Because China is still a developing country, structural changes are likely to
have a greater impact on social security than they did in the West.  The share of
agriculture will decline, as will the importance of the state-owned sector.  Inevitably,
these structural changes will impose costs on older workers and retirees.  Policy makers
must ensure that these vulnerable groups are protected, albeit not coddled, during the
reform process.
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3.1.3 Labor force participation
Figure 6 gives the current labor force participation rate, by age, in China.
Compared to other countries, the labor force participation rate in China is exceptionally
high, peaking at virtually 100 % for males aged 35-39 and over 90% for females.
Around three-quarters of people continue working for at least five years following the
normal retirement age (male 60, female 55), and this percentage is much higher for the
rural area.
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Figure 6: Labor force participation ratio by sex and age in China
Source: ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics (1998)
High economic activity rates after the normal retirement age are an important
buffer minimizing the impact of demographic aging on the social security system.
However, the experience of most countries has been that labor supply of the elderly
participation declines rapidly with rising affluence.  A partial exception to this trend is
Japan, where despite declines, labor force participation of the elderly remains much
higher than in Western countries at similar levels of economic development.  Will China
follow a similar path?
3.1.4 Urbanization, modernization, and cultural change
Because of universal marriage, reduced mortality, and flexible implementation
of the one-child policy in rural areas, the number of elderly Chinese elderly with no
surviving offspring will remain small.  However, how likely are these children to take
care of their aged parents?  The related processes of urbanization and modernization are
weakening traditional institutions and structures, including those related to elder care.
An example is the development of the Township and Village Enterprise (TVE)
system in rural China.  By 1996, 27.5% of rural inhabitants were engaged in such
enterprises, and many villages had become prosperous on the basis of successful TVEs.
Swift development of TVEs and rapid industrialization in some rural areas have brought
tremendous changes to the internal structure of the rural economy and social
relationships.  The economic raison d'être of family solidarity has been weakened.  As a
result, many families will, at least partly, lose their traditional function of supporting
14
their elderly members. Already in some communities made prosperous by new TGVs,
village-level support systems have been set up to substitute for family care for the
elderly.
As agricultural ways of life give way to industrialization and urbanization,
hierarchical family structures are weakening and the extended family is being replaced
by the nuclear family.  Modern means of communication and transportation now
facilitate contacts between family members not living in the same house or area, thus
weakening the necessity for co-residence.  The new emphasis on efficiency in the labor
market means breaking down old barriers to mobility, with consequences for out-
migration of the young.
3.1.5 Government policy
Finally, government policy in the area of social security will be a driving force.
Decisions made today regarding the extent of social insurance coverage, the means of
financing (pay as you go versus funding), etc. will have long-lasting effects.
3.2 Quantitative prospects
In this section we apply simple projection techniques to make ad hoc forecasts
of some major indicators of pensions, health, and disability.  These projections are
meant to serve as a basis for discussion and refinement; they by no means represent a
definitive forecast of the future.
3.2.1 Pensions
In most OECD countries annual pension expenditure accounts for about 10% of
GDP.  With population aging, this proportion will likely rise in the future. In order to
project the pensions to GDP ratio for China, we rely on the multiplicative identity
GDP
BillWageTotal
tsParticipanSystemPensionofNumber
iesBeneficiarSystemPensionofNumber
ForceLabor
tsParticipanSystemPensionofNumber
WageAverage
PensionAverage
GDP
eExpenditurPensionTotal
××
×=
In the above equation part (A) is conceptually similar to the replacement rate,
which gives the benefit level of the pensioners when they retire as a proportion of their
wage prior to retirement.  In China this ratio is now very high, usually around 80% or
even 90%.  Part (B) gives the coverage of the formal pension system.  This number, as
mentioned in the previous section, is very low; the current old-age pension system only
covers around 16% of the total labor force.
Part (C) is the system dependency ratio, closely related to population age
structure.  This number has doubled in the last 5 years, and is already close to 20%.
(A) (B)
(C) (D)
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One reason for such dramatic increase is, of course, population aging.  Moreover, the
SOE and collective sector labor force is aging more rapidly than the labor force at large,
since intake of young workers is minimal.  Finally, early retirement has been heavily
relied upon as a means of shedding workers and improving enterprise efficiency.  Part
(D) is usually a constant number in a mature economy, but could still be changing in
current China.  From 1990 to 1995 this number was steadily decreasing because
enterprises were given more flexibility to retain profits, as a result of which the wage
level did not increase as much as GDP.
Table 1 shows the data for these 4 elements in recent years and the
corresponding results of their product, i.e. the proportion of pension expenditure in
GDP. We can see that, although the proportion of pension expenditure is increasing
continuously, it is still very low compared with most OECD countries or even with
some of the other developing countries.  In 1995 this proportion was still below 2%.
What are likely future trends in the components of the pensions-GDP ratio?  Say
that Part A, the replacement rate, trends downward towards the world average level of
around 60%.  Part B, coverage, will certainly be broadened, but the extent is a matter of
government policy.  Part C, the system dependency ratio, will be fairly close to the old-
age dependency ratio of the population, around 40% in 2050.  Finally, part D, the ratio
of total wage bill over GDP, will approach a constant level.  Among all four elements,
the most variable element is B, coverage.  Therefore, maintaining the same trend for the
other three elements, we introduce three scenarios with low, medium and high coverage
for the future, to see how different assumptions would affect pension expenditures (see
Table 2 and Figure 7).  These scenarios correspond to coverage rates of 30, 50, and
100% of the population in 2050.
Table 1: Total pension expenditure/GDP (1990-1995)
A (replacement rate) B (coverage) C (system
dependency ratio)
D A*B*C*D
Year Average pension/ System participants/ System beneficiaries/ Wage bill/ Total pension
Average wage labor force System participants GDP expenditure/GDP
1990 87.29% 16.56% 12.40% 74.40% 1.33%
1991 89.57% 16.76% 13.40% 70.79% 1.42%
1992 90.30% 16.42% 14.60% 67.36% 1.46%
1993 88.37% 16.26% 16.20% 65.24% 1.52%
1994 86.45% 15.54% 18.10% 65.88% 1.60%
1995 84.00% 15.01% 21.70% 64.65% 1.77%
Data source: China statistical yearbook (1997); China 2020 (World Bank, 1997a)
From Table 2 it is obvious, first, that most of the increase in the pensions to
GDP ratio will occur after 2020, which is sensible since this corresponds to the period
of rapid demographic aging.  Even under the low-coverage scenario, the ratio is
projected to more than double by 2050; however, at 4%, the ratio would still be
extremely low by OECD standards.  By contrast, under the high-coverage scenario,
China’s pension obligations, relative to GDP, would be well within the OECD range by
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2050.  Note that the results of our ratio-based analysis are irrespective of the rate of
growth of GDP.
Table 2: Prospects for the future
A (replacement rate) B (coverage) C (system
dependency ratio)
D A*B*C*D
Year Average pension/ System participants/ System beneficiaries/ Wage bill/ Total pension
Average wage labor force System participants GDP expenditure/GDP
2020 70%
Low: 20%
   Medium: 30%
High: 50%
17% 60%
1.43%
2.14%
3.57%
2050 60%
Low: 30%
   Medium: 50%
        High: 100%
37% 60%
4%
6.67%
13.32%
0
5
10
15
1995 2020 2050
Year
OECD average
(year 2000)
High coverage
100%
Medium coverage
50%
Low coverage
30%
Figure 7. Pension expenditure outlook under different assumptions for coverage
3.2.2 Health
As can be seen from Table 3, during the 15 years from 1978 to 1993 both GDP
and health spending in China increased dramatically. The annual growth rate of GDP
was 7.7%, and health spending per capita increased even faster, with an annual growth
rate of 9.5%.  While the proportion of health care spending in GDP increased only by 1
percentage point over these 15 years, this is because it started from an extremely low
base.
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Table 3: Increase of health spending & GDP (1978-1993)
GDP GDP per capita Total health spending Health spending Total health spending
Year (billions yuan) (yuan) (billions yuan) per capita (yuan) as % of GDP
1978 880.9 915 25.8 27 2.93%
1979 948.2 972 28.7 29 3.03%
1980 1020.8 1034 31.6 32 3.10%
1981 1067.4 1067 34.2 34 3.20%
1982 1158.6 1141 39 38 3.37%
1983 1275.2 1238 43 42 3.37%
1984 1471.1 1410 47.9 46 3.26%
1985 1669.6 1577 49 46 2.93%
1986 1815.4 1689 54.6 51 3.01%
1987 2027.2 1855 62.5 57 3.08%
1988 2256.4 2032 71.1 64 3.15%
1989 2348 2083 77.8 69 3.31%
1990 2436.8 2131 84.8 74 3.48%
1991 2664.3 2300 94.2 81 3.54%
1992 3040.4 2595 103.3 88 3.40%
1993 3451.5 2912 132.1 111 3.83%
Source: China 2020 (World Bank, 1997b)
The approach employed here (from Mayhew, 2000) consists of decomposing
growth in health care spending into two components, one reflecting changing
demography and the second, a residual, reflecting all other sources of change. Let
( )tH
 = health expenditure in year t
( )0H  = health expenditure in the base year
We hypothesize that the rate of growth of total health spending can be
decomposed into two rates, one a growth rate Pr  reflecting demographic conditions
(population size and age structure) and the second an "underlying" growth rate Ur
reflecting change in technology, health system coverage, take-up rates, etc.  If the
demographic situation is summarized by an index ( )tI , then
)(ln1 tI
t
rP =
and it is easy to confirm that
)()0(
)(ln1
tIH
tH
t
rU =
If we define ( ) 10 =I , then the underlying rate can be written
)0(
)(
)(
ln1
H
tI
tH
t
rU =
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so Ur  can be interpreted as the rate of growth of total health care expenditure
normalized by an index of population size and structure.
The index of demographic conditions is defined as
( )
( )
( )∑
∑
=
i
ii
i
ii
cP
tctP
tI )0(0
 )(
where
( )tP1  = population in age group i
)(tci = an age-specific health per capita expenditure index with, say 1)(95 =− tc
( )tI  can be decomposed into components expressing total population change ("volume
effect") and change in composition ("age distribution effect").  The first of these is
( )
( )
( )∑
∑
=
i
i
i
i
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tP
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and the second is
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where )(tpi is the proportion of the population in age group i and
( ) )()( tItItI AV=
In industrial countries, it is possible to obtain explicit estimates for the age-
specific health spending index )(tci .  In China, however, such information is not readily
available.  Therefore, we make the simplifying assumption that
)( )( tdmtc ii =
where m is a time-invariant coefficient of proportionality and )( td i is the age-specific
death rate.  This assumption is based on the observation that most medical expenditure
occurs in the months leading up to death.
We assume three scenarios for the underlying rate Ur , one in which it is one
percentage point higher than the annual GDP growth rate, one in which it is the same,
and one in which it is one percentage point lower.  These scenarios might correspond to
varying rates of penetration of high-tech medical care imported from the West, varying
degrees of success in avoiding moral hazard problems in health insurance, varying
degrees of success in public health programs to address problems such as smoking, etc.
The other assumptions made relate to the demographic outlook (corresponding
to the UN projection illustrated in Figure 2) and the rate of GDP growth (taken from the
World Bank China 2020 reports).
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Table 4: The development of health care expenditure and GDP in China
(1978-2050)
1978-1993 1993-2020 2020-2050
GDP annual growth rate (%) 9.1 6.0 3.0
Health care expenditure annual
growth rate (%),
 of which due to
    - underlying (rU)
    - population & age structure
   -  population change (IV)
       -  aging (IA)
10.9
9.11
1.79
1.38
0.41
high     medium    low
8.46        7.46       6.46
7.0           6.0         5.0
1.46        1.46       1.46
0.72        0.72       0.72
0.74        0.74       0.74
high    medium     low
5.47       4.47        3.47
4.0          3.0          2.0
1.47       1.47        1.47
0.053    0.053     0.053
1.417    1.417     1.417
Total health expenditure (billion
yuan, end of period)
    - As percentage of GDP
GDP (billion yuan, end of period)
132.1
3.8%
3451.5
1297       990        756
7.4%      5.7%     4.3%
17441   17441   17441
6693      3785      2890
15.6%    8.8%     6.7%
42897   42897   42897
Note: See text for explanation of assumptions regarding underlying rate of growth and
GDP growth rate.
0
5
10
15
20
1993 2020 2050
Year
OECD average
(year 2000)
High underlying rate: 4.0%
Medium: 3.0%
Low: 2.0%
Figure 8. Health expenditure under different assumptions for the underlying
rate of growth
If the underlying rate follows the path between the medium scenario and the
high scenario, China will have a health expenditure profile similar to today’s OECD
countries by 2050.  Under all scenarios, by far the most important component of
increase in spending is the assumed underlying rate of growth.  This underscores the
urgency of putting in place a health care finance system which guarantees access to
needed medical care while avoiding problems of moral hazard which have plagued
OECD health systems.  It also raises the question of whether burgeoning demand for
high-tech medical care will "trickle down" from the urban middle classes to the large
population of rural poor
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3.2.3 Disability
Demand for disability services, like demand for health care, is highly age-
dependent.  Data on disability grouped by severity and age are very difficult to find
from Chinese national sources.  To arrive at an indicative picture of trends, therefore, in
the following analysis we use statistics from an in-depth survey of disability carried out
in the UK (Table 5) during the 1980s (OPCS, 1998).
Table 5: Disability rates per thousand by age and severity
Severity   16-19  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80+    All
Most
Intermediate
Least
All
   5          5          5         7         14       27        57      200     22
   7          10        13       23       34       57        112    238     40
   9          16        26       40       85       156      239    276     80
   21        31        44       70       133     240      408    714     142
Source: adapted from OPCS, 1998
Can the statistics in the table be applied to the case of China?  Compared to the
data obtained from an elderly support survey taken in China, the proportion of most
severe disability in the above table corresponds to the proportion of elderly in the
Chinese survey who cannot live on their own, i.e., who need other persons’ help.
Similar proof showing the positive relationship between disability and age could also be
found in the National Sampling Survey of Disability in 1987 China (Lee, 1997).  We
furthermore know that, although disability is more common among the young age group
in China than in the developed countries, China is rapidly acquiring developed-country
morbidity and mortality profiles.  Based on these considerations, the data in Table 5
should be of at least some relevance to China.
In Figures 9 and 10, we display the results of applying the age- and severity
specific disability rates in Table 5 to the UN population projections described earlier.
Figure 9 gives the projected number of people with disability by age group from
1995 to 2050 without stating different severity groups.  It shows us that the number of
disabled persons in young age groups (15-59) will not change much during the coming
50 years; in fact, if disability prevalence among the young declines with economic
development, significant declines might be possible.  On the other hand, the situation
for the old age group, and especially for the older elderly (80+), is becoming
increasingly serious over time.  In 1995, the number of disabled persons in the 80+ age
group was the smallest one among 4 age groups, but it is projected to increase
continuously until 2050, ending with the largest number of disabled people compared to
the other age groups.  This trend is due in its entirety to population age-structure
change.  Growth in the severely disabled population, which places the greatest burden
on long-term care services, will be especially pronounced because of population aging
(see Figure 10 which "breaks out" the forecast by severity class).
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Figure 9: Projected number of people with disabilities by age group (1995-2050)
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Figure 10: Number of disabled persons, 1995 and 2050 by age group and
severity class
With fewer young people to provide care, the burden of within-generation care
giving (i.e., provision of care by a spouse or sibling) is likely to increase and, with the
severity of disability increasing, the care-mix is likely to shift towards professional care
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services.  In 1997 there were 42,385 social welfare institutions in China, housing
785,199 persons, most of them elderly people without family care. But this only covered
2% of the total old disabled population in China, and was already behind the demand.
To meet the higher demand in the future, China will have to start thinking about
increasing the investment in the formal care-giving sector.  Anticipating this need would
help China avoid problems now faced in Japan, which must respond to a severe
shortage of long-term care facilities.  If proper facilities are not available, experience
shows that the severely disabled are either cared for in hospitals (which should serve
acute care needs) or receive insufficient care in a home setting.
4. Concluding remarks
Because of the speed of fertility decline, much of it associated with the "one-
child policy," the population of China will age more rapidly than any population in
history.  At the same time, rapid economic growth has the potential to weaken
traditional care-giving institutions and to increase demand for leisure (i.e., years of
retirement) and high-tech health care.  Also at the same time, social security institutions
inherited from the past are being changed in the context of economy-wide reform.
In this paper, we have described the main institutional structures dealing with
pensions and health in China.  We have also presented ad hoc projections for three
important variables: pension spending, health care spending, and the number of disabled
persons.  Growth in pensions and health and disability spending has the potential to give
China the social-insurance spending profile of a wealthy country while it still has the
income profile of a poor one.  However, while demography makes some increases in
spending inevitable, the most important variables, such as pension system coverage and
the "underlying" growth rate of medical spending, can be influenced by policy.  Under
these circumstances, it is important that Chinese policy makers look forward and put in
place robust social insurance institutions.  Assessment of alternative policies should be
be based not only on the types of ad hoc analysis presented in this paper, but on the
elaboration of full-scale projection and simulation models in accordance with best
international practice.
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Annex
Table A1. Pension expenditures (1978-1997)
Pension Beneficiaries Ratio of Staff and Workers on Their Post State sector
Year (10 000 Persons) to Beneficiaries pension
Total State-
owned
units
Total State-
owned
units
Urban
Collective
ownership
Other
Ownership
expenditures
(billion yuan)
1978 314 284 30.3 26.2 68.3 1.41
1980 816 638 12.8 12.6 13.6 4.01
1985 1637 1165 7.5 7.7 7.1 8.8 11.24
1986 1805 1303 7.1 7.2 6.9 9.2 13.42
1987 1968 1424 6.7 6.8 6.5 12 16.42
1988 2120 1544 6.4 6.5 6.2 12.1 20.9
1989 2201 1629 6.2 6.2 6.2 13.2 24.52
1990 2301 1742 6.1 6 6.3 14.9 30.61
1991 2433 1833 6 5.8 6.2 17.3 36.53
1992 2598 1972 5.7 5.5 5.9 16.6 45.65
1993 2780 2143 5.4 5.1 5.7 13.1 60.09
1994 2929 2249 5.1 4.8 5.2 12.5 84.4
1995 3094 2401 4.8 4.6 5 12.2
1996 3212 2515 4.6 5.9 4.8 11.6
1997 3351 2638 4.4 4.1 4.5 11.8
Source: China Yearbook of Labor Statistics (1995), China Yearbook of Statistics (1995)
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Figure A1. Pension fund revenues and expenditures, 1995
Source: China 2020 (World Bank, 1997a)
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Table A2. National health expenditure (1978, 1986, 1993)
Millions of 1993 yuan
Funding Source 1978 1986 1993
Government budget 7292 (28) 17288 (32) 18878 (14)
Government & state enterprise insurance
systems
7689 (30) 18274 (33) 46108 (36)
Out-of-pocket payments 5268 (20) 14185 (26) 56106 (42)
Rural cooperative medical system 5109 (20) 2918 (5) 2243 (2)
Other 428 (2) 1956 (4) 8713 (6)
Total 25786
(100)
54621 (100) 132048
(100)
Memo item
Total health expenditure as percentage of GDP 2.9 3.2 3.8
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentage shares of the total
Source: China 2020 (World Bank, 1997b)
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